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Separatismand the DemocraticEntitlement
governments, along with judicial review of constitutionality to make sure that majoritarian
decisions do not violate human rights.
SEPARATISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC ENTITLEMENT

by Diane F. Orentlicher*
That international law does not entitle groups other than colonized peoples-and,
perhaps, systematically oppressed groups-to their own state is a familiar claim to
international lawyers, so often repeated that it has acquired a sense of canonical force. But
recent developments have rendered this claim an increasingly inadequate account of
international law relevant to separatist movements. While international law does not
generally support the claims of state-seeking groups, contemporary developments may lend
some secessionists a new source of legitimacy and have significant-if
complex-implications for the resolution of many separatist claims.
The developments I have in mind were chronicled by Thomas Franck in an important
article published six years ago in the American JournalofInternationalLaw. In that article
Franck identified an emerging "democratic entitlement" and described the nascent law this
way: "Democracy is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that increasingly will
be promoted and protected by collective international processes."' Although Franck did not
suggest that this emerging law has substantial implications for separatist movements, I
believe that principles underlying the "democratic entitlement" are scarcely irrelevant to the
legitimacy of their claims.
Before I develop this point, it may be helpful first to make clear what I am not claiming.
It is not my view that the emerging right to self-government generallyprivileges separatist
claims. On the contrary, considerations relating to democratic theory may point in much the
opposite direction. I do, however, disagree with the view that democratic theory is largely,
if not wholly, irrelevant to the resolution of separatist claims.
This view is, in fact, commonplace among political theorists.2 Whether the issue is how
to identify nations that are entitled to their own state or local populations entitled to home
rule, many writers claim that "there is no theory for determining when one ... polity ought
to end and another begin." 3 Consistent with this view, Franck eschews the inference that the
democratic entitlement generally entails the right to choose the territorial boundaries within
which self-government should be exercised or the fellow citizens with whom one will
practice self-government.'
'Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC. This
paper draws upon my analysis in SeparationAnxiety: InternationalResponses to Ethno-Separatist
Claims, 23 YALE J.INT'L L. 1 (1998).
'Thomas M. Franck. The Emerging Right to DemocraticGovernance, 86 AJIL 46 (1992).
2
See, e.g., Frederick G. Whelan, Prologue:Democratic Theory and the BoundaryProblem, in
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, 25 NOMOS 13, 16 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983)

(asserting that "[b]oundaries comprise a problem ...

that is insoluble within the framework of

democratic theory."); Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, HomeRule, andMetropolitanGovernance:The
Secession of Staten Islandas a CaseStudy in the Dilemmas ofLocal Self-Determination,92 COLuM.

L. REv. 775, 800 (1992) (observing that "the concept of self-government says nothing about who is
the 'self' that does the governing").
3
Briffault, supra note 2, at 801.
4
1n his 1992 article, Franck suggested that it is neither "conceptually [nor] strategically
helpful-at least at this stage of development-to treat the democratic entitlement as inextricably
linked to the claim of minorities to secession." Franck, supranote 1, at 52. Citing the principle of selfdetermination as "the historic root from which the democratic entitlement grew," Franck characterizes
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These scholars are surely correct in claiming that a right to democratic government does
not automatically or generally entitle separatists to achieve their aims. Still, it does not
follow that the democratic entitlement is irrelevant to separatist claims.
An appeal to common-sense intuition may help make this clear. Suppose that, instead
of opposing Quebec's bid to secede, the rest of Canada voted in support of the separatists'
claim. Suppose at the same time that residents of Quebec, including all of its significant
minority populations, overwhelmingly voted in favor of secession. If, with Franck, we
believe that an emerging body of international law "requires democracy to validate
governance," 5 I suspect that most of us would conclude that the mutual desire of Canada's
citizens to divide should-perhaps must-be honored. To do otherwise would manifestly
subject Canada's citizens to government without their consent. And as my colleague Jamie
Raskin has written, "the very heart of the democratic idea" is "that governmental legitimacy
depends upon the affirmnative consent of those who are governed." 6
The position I have suggested is not as novel as it may seem. For some eighteenthcentury nationalists-the intellectual progenitors of Franck's democratic entitlement-it
seemed axiomatic that the right to self-government implied the right to choose one's fellow
citizens. The point seemed equally plain to John Stuart Mill:
Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is aprimafaciecase for
uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government
to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question ofgovernment ought to be
decidedby the governed.One hardlyknows what any division ofthe human race should
befree to do, ifnot to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human
beings they choose to associatethemselves.7

The argument is elegant in its simplicity: Since democracy is, by definition, government with
the consent of the governed, the boundaries of political commitment should be determined
in accordance with the principle of consent.
This argument need not imply that the boundaries of states are perennially up for
popular reconsideration; the continuing consent ofstates' citizens can generally be assumed,
and indeed this assumption is indispensable to the daily practice of democracy. But if
consent is manifestly withdrawn by a significant portion of a state's population, the
legitimacy of that state's sovereignty over the rebel population is surely placed in doubt.
Again, let me appeal to common-sense intuition to make this point. It is now established
doctrine that alien states may not lawfully impose their rule upon unconsenting peoples. Put
differently, international law no longer abides colonization or forcible annexation. But if
these forms of nonconsensual rule are incompatible with accepted principles of selfdetermination, surely those same principles are at least challenged by a state's continued
assertion of sovereignty over a defined population that has unambiguously and irrevocably
rejected its sovereignty.

the principle in terms that assume the boundaries of an established political unit: "Self-determination
postulates the right of a people organized in an established territory to determine its collective political
destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore at the core of the democratic entitlement." Id.
5
1d. at 47.
6Jamie B.
Raskin, LegalAliens, Local Citizens: The Historical,Constitutionaland Theoretical
MeaningsofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1444 (1993).
7
JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861), quoted in
UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 392 (1993)
(emphasis added).
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I have tried to make the point that Franck's democratic entitlement may have significant
implications for separatist claims by invoking the proverbial easy case-a hypothetical
situation in which all affected citizens support a separatist claim. But few cases are easy;
most separatist claims are contested. When the will of the affected polity is divided,
democratic theories are not readily dispositive of contested separatist claims. Even so,
theories of democratic government may point to considerations that are relevant to the
legitimacy and resolution of such claims, principally because some resolutions may better
promote values relating to democratic governance than others. By way of illustration, I
would like to explore the implications for separatist claims of two different strands of
democratic theory-utilitarianism and republicanism.
A utilitarian justification for democracy claims that self-government is more likely than
its alternatives to secure the interests of the greatest number of persons subject to
governmental authority. For eighteenth-century utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and
James Mill, democracy was not an end in itself but a means for maximizing the realization
of individuals' interests through aggregation of private preferences. But this justification
may begin to fray if a polity is too diverse, at least if its diversity entails significant
differences in political choices.
When individuals define their political interests in terms of the well-being of the
national group to which they belong, nationalism and utilitarian justifications for democracy
may converge to support national separatist movements. Some contemporary theories of
national self-determination make precisely this type of argument. Asserting that the wellbeing of individuals is tied to the welfare of the national group to which they belong and
which commands their paramount loyalty, some advocates of national self-determination
argue that nation states may offer the best assurance of securing the well-being of nations
and their members.
Although the republican tradition offers a significantly different vision of democracy
than utilitarianism, the former, like the latter, may provide support for at least some
separatist claims. Specifically, the values that are central to republicanism might be furthered
by political divorce resulting in two or more states whose citizens are better able than
citizens of the previously unified state to consider the common good in their democratic
deliberations.
Core principles of republicanism include a commitment to citizen participation in the
deliberative process, made possible by civic virtue; the equality of political actors; and
affirmation of the notion of a common interest or good.' In principle, republicanism not only
tolerates but assumes and even requires some measure of diversity within the self-governing
polity. Republicanism rests on "a belief in the possibility of mediating different approaches
to politics, or different conceptions of the public good, through discussion and dialogue,"9
and sees disagreement as a creative force that promotes political deliberation.'"
Republicanism regards the deliberative process itself as playing a central part in the
constitution of political identity; through this process, initial preferences might be modified
and, ideally, the outcome will promote a common-rather than a majority-good."
'See generally Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443 (1989); Raskin, supra note 6, at 1453-54; Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
9
Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1554 (footnote omitted).
'See id. at 1562, 1575. Sunstein argues that "[m]odern republicanism is thus not grounded in a
belief in homogeneity; on the contrary, heterogeneity is necessary if republican systems are to work."
Id. at 1576.
"See id. at 1554-56.

ASIL Proceedings, 1998
Yet this process requires not only "a commitment to political empathy, embodied in a
requirement that political actors attempt to assume the position of those who disagree,"' 2 but
a capacity to empathize with citizens whose interests may be different from one's own. The
fabric of republicanism, like that of utilitarianism, might be strained by too much diversity
within the polity.'
Similar considerations led John Stuart Mill to conclude that "it is in general a necessary
condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main
with those of nationalities."' 4 Indeed, the capacity to empathize was central to Mill's
conception of nations:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among
themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any
others-which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other
people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government
by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. 5
The claims of republicanism do not lead inexorably to a general rule favoring separatist
claims. Cass Sunstein finds in republican principles themselves the potential for resolving
problems posed by diversity through proportional representation rather than secession. 6
More generally, institutional arrangements designed to promote interethnic accommodation
can go a long way toward assuring cooperation in multiethnic societies.
But if the republican vision of democratic governance does not generally support
separatist movements, neither is it irrelevant to their claims. In certain cases, such as when
part of a population has become unalterably hostile to the interests of another major group
in the same state, republican theories may point toward political divorce on the ground that
separation would produce two states in which republican democracy is viable instead of one
in which conditions are inauspicious for its successful practice.
Thus far I have offered examples of how democratic theories might support separatist
claims. But other considerations, also derived from justifications for self-government or
considerations relating to its successful practice, may point in the opposite direction. As
President Lincoln argued, if a secessionist movement opposed by most of a country's
citizens prevailed, its success would vitiate the principle of majority rule. Further, even the
possibility of secession may thwart democratic deliberations by diminishing incentives for
opposing groups to reach accommodative solutions. When secession is known to be
possible, political minorities within a democracy can distort the outcome of political
processes by threatening to secede if their views do not prevail. 7
Further, a counterpoint to the claim that too much diversity may impair democratic
deliberations is the argument that ethnonational states by their nature tend toward
authoritarian social arrangements. Lord Acton described the threat this way: "In a small and
homogeneous population there is hardly room ... for inner groups of interests that set

2
1d.
3

at 1555 (footnote omitted).

' Cf.id.
at 1556 (observing that "the republican belief in deliberation about the common good is

most easily sustained when there is homogeneity").
14MILL, supra note 7, at 394.

'51d. at 391.
'6See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1588-89.
7
See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECEssION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER
ToLITHUANIAAND QUEBEC 100 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismandSecession, 58 U. CHI.
L. REv. 633, 648-49 (1991).
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bounds to sovereign power."'" In his view, the multiethnic state "provides against the
servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests,
multiplying associations, and giving to the subject the restraint and support of a combined
opinion."' 9 He added: "That intolerance of social freedom which is natural to absolutism is
sure to find a corrective in the national diversities, which no other force could so efficiently
provide. The coexistence of several nations under the same State is a test, as well as the best
security of its freedom.""0 If, with John Locke, we believe that the principle of selfgovernment follows from the intrinsic and equal worth of all people, it is plain that the
authoritarian arrangements associated with ethnonational states imperil the core values
justifying democratic government itself.
Conclusion
The implications of the "democratic entitlement" for separatist claims are at once
profound and complex. Their very complexity calls for exceptional wisdom on the part of
outside actors who may be called upon to respond to separatist claims.

"8Lord Acton, Nationality,in ESSAYS ON FREEDOM AND POWER 141, 165 (1862, 1972).
'9 dat 160.
2
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